THRASYMACHUS THE DIPLOMAT

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PLATONIC CARICATURE can be devastating, and rarely more so than in *Republic* 1. No one would call Thrasymachus diplomatic on the basis of his behavior there. Likened initially to a wild beast (336B), he grows increasingly derisive, accusing Socrates of playing the sycophant (340D), then chiding him as needing a nanny (343A), and finally sarcastically threatening to stick the λόγος in Socrates' soul (345B). There must be some truth to all this bravado: Aristotle reports the gibe, "You're always θρασύμαχος"—always brash and quarrelsome (A6: *Rh.* 2.23 1400b21).[1] But before we condemn the man for bad manners, it is worth asking what provokes him to be so rude. First, the very intensity of his reactions indicates that he speaks from conviction; and the shame he feels when he finally finds himself unable to sustain his claims (350D), while obviously a sign of wounded pride, bespeaks sincerity as well (cf. 349A; see n. 51 below). Thrasymachus is also one of Socrates' more capable interlocutors, quick to use the craft analogy for his own argument (340D–41A) and able to explain his ideas from multiple angles. Above all, he is astute enough to pinpoint the issues that inspire the rest of the dialogue when Plato has his own brothers renew his challenge (358A–B).[2] Indeed, because his subsequent behavior is mentioned only twice, it is easy not to notice that he remains an attentive listener to the end of an extremely long discussion; neither resentful nor docile, he seconds Adeimantus and Glaucon in urging Socrates to provide a full account of the guardians (450A–B).[3] The target of his criticism,

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1. According to Ath. 11 505C, Plato used the same barb; Aristotle ascribes it and a similar pun directed against Polus (Gorgias' associate) to Herodicus, quite likely the redoubtable doctor who was Gorgias' brother; see *Grg.* 448B5, with E. R. Dodds, ed., *Plato: "Gorgias"* (Oxford, 1959), ad loc. Aristotle cites another instance of Thrasymachus' sharp tongue to exemplify the witty use of metaphor (A5: *Rh.* 3.11 1413a5–10). Evidence for Thrasymachus is cited here from Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, eds., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[7] (Berlin, 1954), who distinguish testimony (marked "A") and fragments (marked "B").

2. C. D. Reeve, *Philosopher-Kings* (Princeton, 1988), chap. 1, argues convincingly that his position in Book 1 is more sophisticated than usually allowed. As for his character, it is worth noting that Plato here likens him to a lion (341C), the noblest beast and icon of passionate pride and epic heroism (620B, in connection with Ajax; cf. *Eth. Nic.* 3.8 1116b23–30), that Plato elsewhere refers to him in Homeric diction (*Phdr.* 267C), and that Aristotle counts shame a quasi-virtue for the commendable aspirations it implies (he also thinks it distinctive of youth; *Eth. Nic.* 4.9, cf. *Chrm.* 158C).

3. The point at which Plato recalls his presence is telling: as Socrates broaches the paradoxical proposals in 5–7. In the only other reference to Thrasymachus, Socrates calls him a new friend (498C–D) and promptly offers a charitable reason why so many people (Thrasymachus no doubt included) will find his educational proposals utterly incredible.

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finally, is not traditional morality but the folly of imagining it is the key to success. His initial outburst, after all, occurs when Socrates first impugns the archaic maxim of helping friends and hurting enemies, then ascribes it to tyrants and despots (336A–B); and no less than four times he calls Socrates "naive" (εὐηθής) for imagining that rulers serve the interests of the ruled (336C1, 343D2; cf. 343C6, 348C12). Provoked by what he takes to be moral complacency if not hypocrisy in his hosts and their Athenian friends, his tirades seethe with indignation. His is apparently the cry, as Guthrie suggests, of a disillusioned idealist outraged by what he deems facile nostrums plainly belied by political realities.[4]

Even if Plato's portrait were entirely consistent, it would be foolish to assume it is accurate.[5] More promising is the evidence for Thrasymachus' *own* words and deeds. By far the most substantial item is the opening from one of his speeches that Dionysius of Halicarnassus quotes to illustrate the formative stage of the finest style—the mixed or grand style that reached its acme in Demosthenes (B1: *Dem.* 3).[6] Remarkably, however, the argument of this fragment has yet to receive close analysis. Accidents of transmission evidently bear part of the blame: the most detailed modern discussions take their cue from Dionysius and focus on style.[7] Otherwise, the speech is rarely mentioned except in connection with domestic Athenian politics during the last decade of the Peloponnesian War, since most scholars believe it originated in the debates about constitutional reform in 411 or 404. Though obviously crucial, this belief rests on surprisingly weak foundations, and since confusion about the occasion of a speech can only hinder analysis, my first task is to reconstruct its context.[8] Contrary to received opinion, I propose that Thrasymachus spoke on behalf of his native Chalcedon after an unsuccessful revolt from Athens; his main brief, I shall argue, was to persuade Athens to permit his city to retain substantial autonomy.[9] This resistance to Athenian imperialism, moreover, is parallelled in other evidence of his speeches and actions, and even in his claims in the *Republic,* all of which show Thrasymachus a consistent opponent of outside

4. W. K. C. Guthrie. *A History of Greek Philosophy,* vol. 3 (Cambridge, 1969), 88–97, in a section entitled "The Realists"; cf. Klaus Döring, "Platons Darstellung der politischen Theorien des Thrasymachos und des Protagoras," *AU* 3 (1993): 13–26. Ralf Dahrendorf, "In Praise of Thrasymachus," in his *Essays in the Theory of Society* (Stanford, 1968), 129–50, even proclaims him a forerunner of modern liberalism.

5. Cf. Döring, "Platons Darstellung," 18: *Resp.* 1 by itself yields "ein völlig falsches Bild." J. H. Quincey, "Another Purpose for Plato, *Republic* 1," *Hermes* 109 (1981): 300–15, proposes a rationale for the distortion: Plato sought to dramatize the psychological superiority of Socratic dialectic to emotional rhetoric; but his case is seriously weakened by his assumption that Thrasymachus specialized in *forensic* rhetoric, which is nowhere attested and contradicted by A13 (Dion. Hal. *Isae.* 20; see n. 14 below).

6. Dionysius reports that Theophrastus considered Thrasymachus "the first to arrange and bring it to its present orderliness" (*Dem.* 3). If the speech predates Lysias 34 (from 403), then it is also probably the earliest surviving specimen of deliberative oratory; cf. n. 15 below.

7. For a minute analysis of his stylistic virtues, see F. W. Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit* (Leipzig, 1887), 244–58, and H. C. Gotoff, "Thrasymachus of Calchedon and Ciceronian Style," *CP* 75 (1980): 297–311; still useful for the argument of B1 is K. E. Oppenheimer, "Thrasymachos 1," *RE* 6A (1937): 584–92, esp. 586–88.

8. Neglect of context weakens the admiring discussion by E. A. Havelock, *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics* (New Haven, 1957), 230–39; Guthrie, *History,* 294–98, more cautiously contends that B1 "reads like a genuine contribution to a debate."

9. For the significance and scope of this term, see Martin Ostwald, *Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History* (Chico, 1982).

aggression and a champion of local autonomy. Plato's caricature notwithstanding, Thrasymachus was a gifted speaker, and however rude he may have been in private and among friends, he was evidently capable of shrewd diplomacy in his public oratory.

I. OCCASION AND CONTEXT

First, a brief overview of the fragment. For convenient reference and to clarify the train of thought, I divide it into two paragraphs of five sentences each: first a proem explaining *why* the speaker must speak out; then a preview of *what* he plans to say. Thrasymachus opens with an elaborate antithesis, which develops an apology for speaking into a stinging indictment of his city's recent leaders (§1). After further antitheses proclaim the severity of the crisis (§§2–4), an abrupt apostrophe darkens the picture with a cry of outrage (§5). Turning to his argument, he first rebukes everyone else for thoughtless partisan bickering (§§6–7), then announces the resolution he proposes for the crisis: his city should adhere to its "ancestral constitution" (§§8–10).

[1a] ἐβουλόμην μέν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μετασχεῖν ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου τοῦ παλαιοῦ καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἡνίκα σιωπᾶν ἀπέχρη τοῖς νεωτέροις, τῶν τε πραγμάτων οὐκ ἀναγκαζόντων ἀγορεύειν καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ὀρθῶς τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτροπευόντων· [1b] ἐπειδὴ δ' εἰς τοιοῦτον ἡμᾶς ἀνέθετο χρόνον ὁ δαίμων ὥστε ⟨vac. ca. 20 litt.⟩ τῆς πόλεως ἀκούειν, τὰς δὲ συμφορὰς ⟨vac. ca. 15 litt.⟩ αὐτούς, καὶ τούτων τὰ μέγιστα μὴ θεῶν ἔργα εἶναι μηδὲ τῆς τύχης ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐπιμεληθέντων, ἀνάγκη δὲ λέγειν. [2] ἢ γὰρ ἀναίσθητος ἢ καρτερώτατός ἐστιν ὅστις ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἑαυτὸν ἔτι παρέξει τοῖς βουλομένοις καὶ τῆς ἑτέρων ἐπιβουλῆς τε καὶ κακίας αὐτὸς ὑποσχήσει τὰς αἰτίας. [3] ἅλις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ παρελθὼν χρόνος καὶ ἀντὶ μὲν εἰρήνης ἐν πολέμῳ γενέσθαι καὶ κινδύνῳ, εἰς τόνδε τὸν χρόνον τὴν μὲν παρελθοῦσαν ἡμέραν ἀγαπῶσι, τὴν δ' ἐπιοῦσαν δεδιόσιν, ἀντὶ δ' ὁμονοίας εἰς ἔχθραν καὶ ταραχὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀφικέσθαι. [4] καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑβρίζειν τε ποιεῖ καὶ στασιάζειν, ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐσωφρονοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς ἐμάνημεν, ἃ τοὺς ἄλλους σωφρονίζειν εἴωθεν. [5] τί δῆτα μέλλοι τις ἂν ⟨ἃ⟩ γιγνώσκει εἰπεῖν, ὅτῳ γε λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ νομίζειν ἔχειν τι τοιοῦτον ὡς μηδὲν ἔτι τοιοῦτον ἔσται;

[6] πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοὺς διαφερομένους πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀποδείξω γε παρὰ λόγον πεπονθότας πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅπερ ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄνευ γνώμης φιλονικοῦντας πάσχειν· [7] οἰόμενοι γὰρ ἐναντία λέγειν ἀλλήλοις οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τὰ αὐτὰ πράττοντες οὐδὲ τὸν τῶν ἑτέρων λόγον ἐν τῷ σφετέρῳ λόγῳ ἐνόντα. [8] σκέψασθε γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἃ ζητοῦσιν ἑκάτεροι. [9] πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πάτριος πολιτεία ταραχὴν αὐτοῖς παρέχει ῥᾴστη γνωσθῆναι καὶ κοινοτάτη τοῖς πολίταις οὖσα πᾶσιν. [10] ὁπόσα μὲν οὖν ἐπέκεινα τῆς ἡμετέρας γνώμης ἐστίν, ἀκούειν ἀνάγκη λόγων τῶν παλαιοτέρων, ὁπόσα δ' αὐτοὶ ἐπεῖδον οἱ πρεσβύτεροι, ταῦτα δὲ παρὰ τῶν εἰδότων πυνθάνεσθαι.[10]

1a ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι Sylburg: ωθ codd. 1b lac. codd.: ⟨τὰς μὲν εὐπραξίας⟩ . . . ⟨ὁρᾶν⟩ Blass: ⟨ἑτέρων μὲν ἀρχόντων⟩ . . . ⟨πάσχειν⟩ Diels 2 καρτερώτατος codd. (cf. *Phd.* 77A8): καρτερικώτατος Usener 3 κινδύνῳ Radermacher: διὰ κινδύνων codd.: ⟨ἐλθεῖν⟩ post κινδύνων add. Diels 5 ⟨ἃ⟩ γιγνώσκει εἰπεῖν Diels (cf. Thuc. 8.68.1: κράτιστος [Antiphon] . . . ἃ γνοίη εἰπεῖν): γιγνώσκειν εἰπεῖν codd.: γιγνώσκων εἰπεῖν Blass: γεγωνίσκειν [εἰπεῖν]

10. Because the text at several points is far from secure, I provide a selective apparatus; for a fuller report, see the edition of Hermann Usener and Ludwig Radermacher, *Dionysii Halicarnasei, Quae Extant,* vol. 5 (Stuttgart, 1899).

Radermacher 5 lac. post γε indic. Radermacher: ⟨γέγονε⟩ Diels: ⟨ὑπάρχει⟩ Blass 6 παρὰ λόγον Usener: προλέγων codd. 10 λόγων Diels: λέγειν codd.

[1a] I used to wish, Athenians, I'd had a part in affairs long ago when younger men could stay silent, since the situation did not compel them to speak out and the elders oversaw the city correctly; [1b] but since the divinity has reserved us for a time like this when we hear our city's ⟨ . . . ⟩ and ⟨ . . . ⟩ its misfortunes ourselves—and the greatest of these are the work not of gods or fortune but of the people in charge— I am compelled to speak. [2] For only a man who is senseless or extremely stubborn will keep exposing himself to people bent on doing wrong, and then accept the blame for the treachery and villainy of others. [3] Time enough has gone by that instead of peace we face war and danger—even now we cherish the day gone by but dread the one to come—and instead of concord we have reached mutual hatred and turmoil.[11] [4] Others great prosperity makes arrogant and rebellious, but we were sensible in our prosperity, and we went mad when times were bad, which typically brings others to their senses. [5] Why on earth then would anyone hesitate to say what he knows, if he is suffering in the present situation and believes he has a way to change it?[12]

[6] So first I shall show that all those who now disagree, both the politicians and the rest, have unexpectedly experienced exactly what thoughtless rivals are bound to experience. [7] Though they think they are contradicting one another, they aren't aware that they are doing the same things and their opponents' position is contained in their own. [8] Consider from the start what each side seeks. [9] First, the ancestral constitution is causing them turmoil, though it is easiest to know and shared most by all citizens. [10] Now, for all that lies beyond our knowledge we must rely on older reports, but all that our elders have themselves observed, *this* we must learn from those who know.

The scholarly consensus is that Thrasymachus never delivered this speech, since the speaker appears to address the Athenian Assembly, which only citizens ordinarily could do. Some have therefore proposed that the excerpt was only a model for study and imitation; more popular is the suggestion that he composed it for an Athenian, presumably an advocate of narrower democracy, to deliver in the constitutional debates of 411.[13] A number of points tell against the first proposal, most notably that Dionysius, who had more to draw on than we do, claims to quote it "from one of the public speeches" (ἐξ ἑνὸς τῶν δημηγορικῶν λόγων). Although the Suda ascribes a collection of "rhetorical openings" (ἀφορμαὶ ῥητορικαί) to Thrasymachus (A1), Dionysius characterizes B1 as only an excerpt: ἐξ implies that it originally continued, and λόγων suggests a complete speech. In calling it a "public" speech, in fact, he implies that it was actually delivered.[14] This

11. Text and construction are uncertain; because the first infinitive governs the prepositional phrase ending with κινδύνῳ, I construe εἰς τόνδε τὸν χρόνον with the following participles, which depend on ἡμῖν.

12. The absence of a finite verb in the relative clause has prompted various emendations; my translation simply assumes an unexpressed copula. For clarity's sake, I have severely abbreviated the wordplay in the last clause, where the first τοιοῦτον introduces a result clause but the second refers to τοῖς παροῦσι. Result clauses with the future are uncommon; but a remarkable parallel occurs in a speech to the Spartans by the Thessalian Polydamas (cf. *Resp.* 338C; see n. 58 below): καὶ νομίζω οὕτως ἔχειν . . . ὡς . . . ἀποστήσονται αὐτοῦ αἱ πόλεις (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.14).

13. See Alexander Fuks, *The Ancestral Constitution* (London, 1953), 102–106; for subsequent views, see Martin Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley, 1986), 367.

14. Dionysius elsewhere says that Thrasymachus "has not left [οὐκ ἀπολέλοιπε] forensic or deliberative speeches" (A13: *Isae.* 20); but he may mean only that none were *extant* (as one would say about Pericles), not that none were ever delivered. Other testimony backs this up: Dionysius himself calls B1 δημηγορικός and the Suda lists συμβουλευτικοί. This led Eduard Schwartz, *Index Scholarum* (Rostock, 1892), 5 (in his

also accords best with his report that Theophrastus credited Thrasymachus with Demosthenic grandeur (*Dem.* 3)—a very odd assertion if he never delivered speeches in public. True to his ancient reputation, moreover, the speech displays striking self-confidence. Despite his opening apology for temerity (§1a), he promptly rebukes the authorities (§1b); and the first sentence in each paragraph isolates attention on the speaker with first-person singular verbs: his very first word, a bold ἐβουλόμην, introduces a sharp antithesis (cf. Antiphon 5.1), and ἀποδείξω in §6 underscores a vaunt that the speaker alone has risen above factionalism. Further, the prologue displays an expansiveness that smacks of public address; in this it sounds decidedly more authentic than the only other extant public speech from the fifth century, Lysias 34, which only sketches its ideas in the manner of a brief or pamphlet. Indeed, whereas Dionysius registers doubt about the delivery of Lysias 34 (*Lys.* 32), he labels B1 "public" without any qualification. B1 thus differs fundamentally from the only certain model-speeches that are extant, all of which are forensic. It also indicates an audience repeatedly, whereas Antiphon's tetralogies show no signs of delivery (e.g., no vocatives or mention of jurors); and it addresses a present crisis, whereas the extant models by other sophists deal instead with cases from myth (e.g., Gorgias B11).

More plausible is the suggestion that Thrasymachus composed the speech for a client. After all, providing a script for someone else to deliver is an excellent reason for writing down a speech. But there are obviously other plausible explanations for the survival of B1. Someone with convictions as strong as those it displays must have been eager to publicize his views and build support for his case, which promptly circulating his ideas in writing would do. And if the speech was successful or well received, Thrasymachus might well have sought to advertise his eloquence by circulating copies after the fact.[15] More to the point, whereas Dionysius refuses to discuss Antiphon's work precisely because he wrote for others, he compares Thrasymachus to Critias (*Isae.* 20), whose personal engagement in politics is infamous. Preserving and circulating the script of a powerful plea for autonomy would serve the speaker's political cause as well as any private ambitions. Finally, since envoys to Athens were regularly invited to address either or both Council and Assembly, Thrasymachus could have delivered B1 himself if its occasion was diplomatic.[16]

Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2 [Berlin, 1956], 112–35), to propose excising συμβουλευτικούς in A13, and his proposal has been widely accepted; cf. *Resp.* 350E1, where Thrasymachus predicts that Socrates will accuse him of δημηγορεῖν. Even without emendation, the inconsistency is explicable: Dionysius wrote *Isae.* (A13) before *Dem.* (B1), hence perhaps before encountering the speech; or he may have found B1 in a collection of excerpts, either by various hands or only by Thrasymachus (see following note).

15. Plato depicts Thrasymachus as eager to earn money for his insights (337D), and the "Great Art" mentioned in B3 (cf. n. 41 below) may well have included this and other illustrative speeches or excerpts as models for study or imitation (cf. the "openings" listed by the Suda in A1). For the origins of the practice of collecting exemplary samples in a handbook, see Thomas Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore, 1991), 71–94, esp. 83–85.

16. Spartan envoys in 420 speak first to the Council, then to the Assembly (Thuc. 5.45.1; cf. 4.22.3); cf. Mytilene's envoys in 427 (Thuc. 3.36.5); see F. E. Adcock and D. J. Mosley, *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (London, 1975), 152–82.

The main basis for doubting that Thrasymachus ever delivered B1 is the assumption that the speech is about domestic politics in Athens. But apart from the disproportionate bulk of evidence for Athens (and the Athenocentric bias this creates), the grounds for this assumption are extremely tenuous. Nothing either in Dionysius or in the fragment itself proves a purely Athenian debate. First, although Dionysius fully explains the occasion when he quotes from Lysias' only known speech to the Assembly (*Lys.* 33, introducing Lysias 34), he quotes Thrasymachus without a word about context.[17] Diction is also inconclusive. B1 contains only one proper name, and it is an editorial supplement: the vocative "Athenians" in §1a is Sylburg's sixteenth-century supplement for a drastic abbreviation in the principal manuscripts, which show only two letters: ω and θ.[18] A paleographically possible alternative is "Thessalians"; and the only other firmly attested speech by Thrasymachus was for Larissa (B2). Even if correct, Sylburg's supplement identifies only the audience and entails nothing about speaker or subject. No personal pronouns or verbs indicate the speaker's relation to this audience: he refers directly to them only once, and simply to request their attention (σκέψασθε, §8); indeed, if the issue was strictly Athenian, ἐπείδετε would be more apt in §10 than ἐπεῖδον.[19] Nor is there any mention of local institutions or events pointing to a specific site, let alone to Athens. This vagueness hardly favors Athens: Lysias 34 clearly identifies its issue as Athenian, whereas Thucydides offers only vague generalities in the openings of several diplomatic speeches (1.73, cf. 2.60, 3.37; cf. the frustrating vagueness of the speech ascribed to "Herodes"). Omission of details is actually quite natural, since the speaker plainly considers his audience already familiar with the issues (§§6–9), and the excerpt ends before he enters into details.

On balance, an Athenian audience appears likely. The reference to "rhetors" (§6) fits best in a democracy, where it labels those who play the principal but often unofficial role in political debate; and coupling them with "the others" also suits a context of debate open to more than local

17. Dionysius, who is our only source for this and for Lysias' Olympic oration (33 in *Lys.* 30), in each case quotes the opening only after providing detailed prefaces (*Lys.* 29 and 32), even though both prologues describe their context quite adequately.

18. Radermacher's apparatus also suggests peculiarities in the theta. Of the three mss. he used, Usener says about M, "eius praestantia etsi non tanta est ut ceteris apographis carere possimus, tamen ea maxime re eminet quod locos exempli hiantes accuratissime omnium expressit" (p. xv): about B, which matches M, he says "scriba rudis scopa potius quam calamo exaravit, isque tam neglegenter ut nauseam faciat lectionis discrepantiam et enotanti et adnotanti" (p. xix); and about P, which has ωθεν, he says, "rara neglegentia scriptus quippe ex dictatione hominis non opinor graeci, exceptus tamen aliquando antiquae lectionis testis est veracior quam M" (p. xvii). On Sylburg's influential 1587 edition, see pp. xxviii–xxx, xxxviii; his supplement is preferable to Radermacher's ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι: envoys to Athens apparently addressed the Assembly simply as "Athenians" (Thuc. 1.32.1, 4.17.1).

19. The fragment contains four first-person plurals: two (§§1b, 10) generalize indefinitely; the others (§§3, 4) refer to the speaker's city but without indicating whether it is also the audience's. Explicit reference to the Assembly is not to be expected: extant speeches tend to address the Assembly simply as "men of Athens" or "Athenians" (juries are typically simply "men"). More generally, envoys had first to be introduced; see *Ach.* 61–125, 134–73, cf. Thuc. 5.46.5. This may explain why they typically use the same forms of address as citizens do (e.g., the Melians in Thuc. 5.112.2; the Mytilenean Euxitheus in Antiphon 5). For obvious reasons, foreigners are also more likely to preserve a distinction in the pronouns they use for themselves and for their audience, as at Melos (Thuc. 5.85–113); cf. the Corcyreans in Athens in 433 (1.32–36), and the Spartans in 425 (4.17–20); Antiphon wrote "we" for envoys from Samothrace (frags. 50–54 Thalheim) but "you" for Athenian speakers (frags. 1a and 139).

officials. The accusations of rivalry and incompetence (§§6–7) even recall Cleon's rebukes in the Mytilenean debate (especially 3.37.4–5, 3.40.3). However, not only is all this compatible with a diplomatic debate; other details actually tell against domestic affairs. The complaint in §3 about war and civic turmoil, combined with the nostalgic reference in §4 to lost prosperity, suggests that both internal and external problems have arisen fairly recently. Yet Athens avoided serious discord for most of the war, and when it did finally develop after the Sicilian debacle, peace was long since past.[20] It is also odd, if Athens' internal affairs are at issue, that someone who longs for bygone days would trace his city's "madness" back only to the advent of misfortune (§4), presumably in 413, and not to the demagogues of the 420s, or the even earlier policies that first brought war to Attica in 431. The situation envisioned, then, suggests a city relatively remote from major conflict.

The praise in §9 for the πάτριος πολιτεία is a major reason why scholars have associated B1 with Athenian constitutional debates during the last decade of the Peloponnesian War. But here again, extant parallels are indecisive. Similar slogans are well attested for several other cities; in documentary evidence, in fact, they typically occur in a context of *intercity* relations.[21] Almost inevitably, the appeal specifically to an "ancestral *constitution*" is best attested for Athens. But even this slogan apparently enjoyed much wider appeal. Xenophon uses the phrase (in the plural) quite generally in reference to the constitutional turmoil that embroiled numerous Greek cities in Asia Minor after Athens surrendered and Lysander installed narrow oligarchies and decarchies in cities up and down the region (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2; cf. Diod. 14.13.1). What was supposed to be ancestral no doubt varied from city to city, hence involved issues of autonomy (cf. 3.4.5); but it is clear that the slogan was used to recommend oligarchy as well as democracy (3.4.7). Thus, Athenian proponents of an "ancestral *constitution*" in 411 and the following years actually sought to *exclude* thousands from citizen-rights. Whether or not they deserve to be called "moderates," as many have argued, they could hardly recommend their goal, as B1 does, as "shared most by *all* citizens" (κοινοτάτη τοῖς πολίταις πᾶσιν).[22] Their oligarchic aims, in short, are explicitly contradicted by B1, which presents an *inclusive* government as the fundamental goal on which *all* sides agree.

All these peculiarities disappear if the crisis described arose elsewhere than Athens, and if the issue under discussion is the fate not of Athenian democracy but of a city only recently fallen foul of Athens. The speaker's opening claim, that his city had a long tradition of orderly government

20. Pace Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit,* 258, followed by Fuks, *Ancestral Constitution,* 104.

21. See Ostwald, *Autonomia,* 3–6. Appeals to πάτρια, though best attested for Athens, are often made by non-Athenians in non-Athenian contexts: a Theban herald advises Plataeans in the stasis of 431 to abandon Athens for the Boeotian League κατὰ τὰ πάτρια (Thuc. 2.2.4); Brasidas in 424 persuades Acanthus to revolt and join Sparta by promising to uphold τὸ πάτριον (4.86.4); the terms of the general armistice following the fall of Amphipolis in 423 refer to πατρίους νόμους (Thuc. 4.118.1); and Plato simply equates πάτριοι νόμοι with unwritten laws (e.g., *Leg.* 793A–B). See Ostwald, *Popular Sovereignty,* 337–411.

22. On Athens, see Ostwald, *Popular Sovereignty,* 369–72 and 469–75, and M. I. Finley, "The Ancestral Constitution," in his *The Use and Abuse of History* (New York, 1971), 34–59.

disrupted only by recent leaders (§1), then serves to focus blame on a few and exonerate the city as a whole. The implication that most of his fellow citizens are both innocent and trustworthy shows that justice suits Athenian interests: limiting reprisals to "the people in charge" (§1b) will at once remove the source of turmoil (§3) and enable the rest of the city to return to its former "good sense" and prosperity (§4). That is why the speaker contradicts other voices and urges that his city return to its traditional government (§§6–9): the greater autonomy of earlier days, with the stability and prosperity it produced, suits the interests of Athens as well as of his own city. The plea for "the ancestral constitution" is thus part of his strategy for negotiating a lenient settlement.

Though inevitably conjectural, this diplomatic scenario fits the fragment better than previous interpretations do. Its plausibility increases in the light of the extensive diplomatic service in Athens by other sophists. Most famous is the embassy Gorgias led in 427, when he sowed the seeds of the Sicilian campaign by persuading the Assembly to approve an alliance with his native Leontini (*Hp. Mai.* 282B; cf. Diod. 12.53, Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 3).[23] Hippias too, in a dialogue set during one of many missions to Athens, boasts that Elis always turns to him first for important diplomacy (*Hp. Mai.* 281A– B; cf. Philostr. *VS* 1.11.5). There we also hear that Prodicus served his native Ceos on a number of embassies to Athens and once delivered an especially impressive speech to the Council (*Hp. Mai.* 282C; cf. Philostr. *VS* 1.12). Given our slender evidence, this is an impressive record of political activity by sophists. It is only reasonable, after all, that cities would send shrewd and persuasive negotiators on diplomatic missions; and cities less confident of their own even sought professional help: Antiphon wrote not only for foreigners summoned to appear in Athenian courts (as in Antiphon 5) but also for envoys from Lindos and Samothrace (frags. 25–33, 49–56; both missions concerned tribute, probably ca. 418). If Chalcedon had crucial business to conduct with Athens, then, it would naturally turn to its most eloquent citizens.

Indirect confirmation for this scenario comes from an especially striking claim in the speech. Unlike people everywhere else, Thrasymachus boasts, his city remained sensible even in its success (μετὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐσωφρονοῦμεν, §4). This immunity to the cycle of corruption beloved by archaic moralizers—from κόρος to ὕβρις to ἄτη—is presented as rare if not exceptional (τοὺς ἄλλους twice). But similar claims can be found in two other accounts of this period. One parallel involved Chalcedon itself, which Theopompus described as remaining "most sensible and moderate" (σωφρονεστάτων καὶ μετριωτάτων) until it was compelled to adopt a democratic regime (F62: Ath. 12 526D–F):[24]

23. He was apparently not on the embassy of 433/2; see *IG* 1^3 54: *GHI* 64. Cf. Jacques Brunschwig, "Hippias d'Élis, Philosophe-Ambassadeur," in *The Sophistic Movement*, ed. G. B. Kerferd (Athens, 1984), 269–76.

24. In political contexts, σωφροσύνη is often a virtue specifically of obedience (cf. *Chrm.* 159B and 160B); citing Thuc. 3.82.8, Helen North, *Sophrosyne: Self-knowledge and Self-restraint in Greek Literature* (Ithaca, 1966), 110–15, calls it "the shibboleth of the oligarchs"; cf. Simon Hornblower, *Thucydides* (Baltimore, 1987), 161–64.

> Before the Chalcedonians adopted this [sc. democratic] constitution, they all used to keep busy and lead a better sort of life. But when they got a taste of democracy from the people of Byzantium, they were corrupted by luxury and, living only for the present, changed from the most sensible and moderate people into heavy drinkers and big spenders [διεφθάρησαν εἰς τρυφὴν καὶ τὸν καθ' ἡμέραν βίον ἐκ σωφρονεστάτων καὶ μετριωτάτων φιλοπόται καὶ πολυτελεῖς γενόμενοι].

Although Theopompus probably had later events in view, his point is that Chalcedon's restraint was a tradition both long-standing and, given his superlatives, exceptional.[25] But it was not unique. Commenting on the prudence of the Chian revolt from Athens in 412, Thucydides observes that, "after Sparta, the Chians alone among those I have noticed combined prosperity and good sense [ηὐδαιμόνησάν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν] and grew more stably ordered [ἐκοσμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον] the greater their city became" (8.24.4). Chios, however, cannot be the subject of Thrasymachus' speech, which implies that war is only a recent trouble. Both cities revolted in 412; but Chios was Athens' single most active ally and contributed forces to almost every major campaign from the 440s on, whereas Chalcedon apparently avoided combat for several decades.[26] Thrasymachus' point, then, is that his city, unlike almost all others, had long accepted Athenian oversight. Only the recent leadership singled out in his opening complaint (§1b) had incited revolt, and they had allegedly faced considerable internal opposition (§3).

Three periods of disorder are attested for Chalcedon. The earliest, coinciding with the Samian revolt of 440/39 and which Byzantium also joined, is much too early; Thrasymachus was then a teenager at most and hardly old enough to serve as an envoy (πρεσβεύς from πρέσβυς).[27] The latest is well after the war, when a Spartan garrison posted there by Lysander when he captured the city after Aegospotami in 405 (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.1–2) was driven out by Thrasybulus in 390/89 (4.8.26–28). But it would be absurd at so late a date to pretend that war and civil turmoil were only recent developments (as in §3). Most likely, then, is the period between 412 and 407,

25. On F62, see M. A. Flower, *Theopompus of Chios* (Oxford, 1994), 78–79; since F62 is ascribed to *Philippica* 8, Flower (p. 124) connects it with events of the 350s or 340s; but a reference back to changes in the 390s or 380s is also possible (cf. Flower, *Theopompus* 163–64, and n. 43 below). As a colony of Megara, Chalcedon was apparently governed by a moderate oligarchy; like many other cities, it probably adopted democracy only under outside pressure. Theopompus says it was influenced by Byzantium, which was still an oligarchy in 408; see B. H. Isaac, *The Greek Settlements in Thrace Until the Macedonian Conquest* (Leiden, 1986), 227; but the earliest securely attested change in government resulted from Thrasybulus' campaign in 390/89 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.27). Oligarchy also suits the way Thrasymachus describes the city's earlier leaders: "overseeing" (ἐπιτροπεύειν) connotes the distinctly paternalistic authority of "guardians" and "regents" (ἐπίτροποι), and Plato uses it of the "aristocratic" rulers of Καλλίπολις (*Resp.* 519C1); the word would thus be ill-suited to democratic Athens.

26. There is no clear evidence for fighting at Chalcedon after its integration into the Delian League early in the 470s. The city may have known trouble in the early 430s, when an Athenian fleet came to Byzantium after the Samian revolt (Plut. *Per.* 20; Thuc. 1.115, 117.3); but significant support for Athens is implied by Thucydides' report that Lamachus sought refuge for his troops at Chalcedon in 424 (4.75.2).

27. On the possibility of turmoil then, see the preceding note; for Chalcedon's ἐπιφορά in 433, see Russell Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1972), 247–48, 432–33, 545. To serve as an envoy at so early a date, Thrasymachus would need to have been born by 470, whereas he was probably born around 440: Dionysius thought him younger than Lysias (A3: *Lys.* 6; cf. Pl. *Phdr.* 269D), whose birth he puts in 459; K. J. Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum* (Berkeley, 1968), 28–46, suggests Lysias was born much later, ca. 444; and J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* (Oxford, 1971), 587–88, proposes the decade 445–36. For further reasons for downdating Thrasymachus' activity, see appendix 1 below.

when a wave of revolt swept the Hellespont and Aegean in the aftermath of Syracuse (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3, Thuc. 8 passim). Then, when even loyal and cautious Chios revolted, Chalcedon broke free of Athens and accepted a Spartan garrison under the harmost Hippocrates.[28] This wave of revolt and στάσις, then, would be the source of the "evils" Thrasymachus mentions in §4, and "the people in charge" (τῶν ἐπιμεληθέντων), whom he derides in §1b, would have included both local rebels and the Spartan forces that soon intervened.[29] Incidentally, the aorist here is significant: if inceptive, it refers to the seizure of power in some sort of coup; otherwise, it suggests that the leaders had fallen from power by the time the speech was given.

Athens, beset by discord of its own, needed several years to regain control in the Hellespont. Cyzicus in 410 was the first to submit, soon followed by Perinthus; Selymbria agreed to supply funds but refused admission to Athenian forces (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.19–21). The following year, Athenian forces instituted a heavy ten percent tariff on cargo from the Pontus and fortified a post to collect it just outside Chalcedon (1.1.22). But despite a severe defeat in the field and the death of the Spartan harmost, Chalcedon itself withstood siege for another year. Finally, in 408, it negotiated a preliminary settlement, which was soon expanded to include the satrap Pharnabazus (1.3.8–14). The terms included stiff financial penalties, but apparently not the restoration of Athenian control (see n. 31 below). Alcibiades then turned to Byzantium, which he captured with difficulty, before returning to Athens—after the main fleet (1.4.10–12) but in time for the Plynteria in May or June 407 (Plut. *Alc.* 34.1–2). After overseeing final ratification of terms for the East, and supervising a rousing celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, he departed again that fall (34.3–35.2).

The natural occasion for Thrasymachus' speech in this sequence is debate in the Assembly over the final terms for Chalcedon in the summer of 407.[30] With so many parties involved, negotiations must have been more complex than usual. The Athenians faced the inevitable differences between proponents of harsher and milder terms, but also added complications caused by

28. See Plut. *Alc.* 29–31, Diod. 13.66. For a concise narrative, see N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Greece* (Oxford, 1986), 409–13; for a full account, Donald Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire* (Ithaca, 1987). I venture to specify years in what follows, but chronology for this period is notoriously problematic due to obscurities in Xenophon's narrative; for a summary of the problems, see Antony Andrewes, *CAH,* vol. 5^2 (Cambridge, 1992), 503–5.

29. The verb ἐπιμέλεσθαι is used for a variety of officially delegated functions but, presumably because it implies *delegation,* it often refers to "overseers" assigned by a foreign power to manage the affairs of subject states: a Spartan harmost (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.11), a Spartan commander (4.8.23), and a Spartan naval officer in the Hellespont (*Hell. Oxy.* 17.4); a satrap (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.17); Athenian generals posted near Chalcedon in 409 (1.1.22) and later at Rhodes (*Hell. Oxy.* 10.1); even men in charge of herds (Pl. *Grg.* 516A)—an idea Plato has Thrasymachus reject (*Resp.* 343A–B). Documentary usage, though similarly diverse, includes Athenian officials in charge of judicial procedures in subject states: ἐπιμεληταί at Miletus after 450 (*IG* 1^3 21.42, cf. 35 and 49) possessed "drastic powers" (D. W. Bradeen and M. F. McGregor, *Studies in Fifth-Century Epigraphy* [Norman, 1973], 68); cf. Athenian generals at Chalcis in 445 (*IG* 1^3 40.77, cf. 20 and 44: *GHI* 52) and at Thracian Neapolis in 407 (in a postscript to a decree of 409, *IG* 1^3 101.53: *GHI* 89), and those in charge of suits alleging mishandling of tribute (*IG* 1^3 68.46: *GHI* 68). Fourth-century Athenian evidence shows ἐπιμεληταί used for several lesser officials assigned to oversee various public works and festivals; see Robert Develin, *Athenian Officials: 684–321 B.C.* (Cambridge, 1989), esp. 12–13.

30. Debate presumably addressed the final ratification after Alcibiades returned, as with Selymbria (*IG* 1^3 118: *GHI* 87; cf. Plut. *Alc.* 30) and the Clazomeneans at Daphnus (*IG* 1^3 119: *GHI* 88), both of which bills were moved by Alcibiades himself in 407; for settlements with other cities in the Hellespont and Pontus, see Isaac, *Greek Settlements.* On the date, see also appendix 1.

their own recent discord, by a military command that had at times operated independently of the city, and by the ever controversial Alcibiades, now home for the first time since 415. On the other side, Chalcedon had of course to deal with its dissidents and exiles. But Spartan forces had also played a key role, Pharnabazus was personally involved, and a tortuous trail of diplomacy already led all the way back to the Persian King himself (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.8–14). At issue was the possibility of retaliation and occupation, as well as penalties and reparations. Early in the campaign, Alcibiades had confiscated property that Chalcedon—or at least its wealthier citizens—had deposited at Heraclea (1.3.3); and once the city submitted, the Athenians demanded an indemnity of twenty talents, restored the previous tribute, and even imposed repayment of debts (1.3.8–9).[31] Reducing this burden, or at least preventing harsher sanctions, must have been one of Thrasymachus' goals when the initial terms came up for final ratification in Athens. But it would be foolish to raise financial questions before showing why his city deserved leniency in the first place. To judge from his prologue, moreover, the crucial issues were political rather than financial. For if preserving the "ancestral constitution" was his principal goal, there was surely a threat of suspending it and imposing tighter supervision by Athenian forces or local sympathizers.[32]

With autonomy and leniency as its goals, the elements of the speech fall neatly into place. Thrasymachus begins by painting a stark contrast between his city's former discipline and prosperity, and its recent misfortunes, which he blames entirely on bad leadership (§§1–4). To avoid brutal reprisals such as Mytilene had narrowly escaped two decades earlier, Thrasymachus points both to his city's history of compliance, which he commends by recalling its exceptional σωφροσύνη (§4), and to its present desperate straits, which he emphasizes by a crescendo of startling antitheses (§§3–4).[33] Despite the severity of the current crisis, however, the remedy he proposes is utterly simple: restore its "ancestral constitution," he implies, and his city will return to its former discipline. Even in cities that revolt, after all, civil discord (§§3–4) entails the presence of citizens opposed to revolt. Emphasizing the simplicity of his solution thus casts both the citizenry as a whole and its prior leadership in a positive light. All sides in the current debate, he continues, whether in favor of harsh or generous terms (§6), are worried about the former government (§9). But that worked perfectly well (§§1a, 4; cf. n. 25);

31. See Kagan, *Fall,* 276–86, esp. 279–81, on the novel arrangements in the field treaty; he points out (p. 286) that the treaty helped Alcibiades regain prestige in Athens by demonstrating the value of his influence with Pharnabazus. Chalcedon's pre-war tribute, at nine talents annually from 447–38, was relatively high; see Meiggs, *Athenian Empire,* 544–45, cf. Isaac, *Greek Settlements,* 225.

32. Issues of autonomy probably included judicial arrangements; though most cities had to bring many cases before Athenian courts, Athens had long granted some cities the privilege of resolving most disputes at home; see A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides,* vol. 1 (Oxford, 1945), 236–43, ad 1.77.1. Debate might therefore have included a request for generous terms like those granted Selymbria in 407 (*IG* 1^3 118: *GHI* 87; cf. Plut. *Alc.* 30) or the autonomy granted Samos in 405 (*IG* 1^3 127: *GHI* 94); cf. the honor awarded the Byzantines who enabled Alcibiades to recover their city (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.14–22, 2.2.1).

33. To excuse the city's resistance to siege, he could have (as the sequel may have) gone on to recount horrors like those attested for nearby Byzantium, where the Spartan harmost, under siege by Alcibiades, let the city's women and children starve in order to feed his troops (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.19; more lurid is Plut. *Alc.* 31); cf. Lysander's alleged deception and brutalities a few years later there and on Thasos (Plut. *Lys.* 13–14).

only recent usurpers are to blame (§1b), and since those have now been removed by the city's recent submission, the rest of the city will return to peace and concord—hence also compliance—under its former system (§4).[34]

His advocacy of the πάτριος πολιτεία, then, is not intended as an endorsement of oligarchy. On the contrary, by defending it as extremely inclusive (κοινοτάτη), Thrasymachus presents his city's traditional government in the best possible light for an Athenian audience in 407, as virtually democratic. Likewise, his parallel claim that their ancestral government is also "easiest to know" (ῥᾴστη γνωσθῆναι) probably serves to insist at once on its predictability and its basic loyalty to Athens.[35] Thus, while deftly framing the issues in terms that evoke his audience's own recent and ongoing debates, he diplomatically obscures Chalcedon's oligarchic traditions. Even if his claims are only exaggerations calculated to appeal to his Athenian audience, his plea for restoring his city's traditional government is above all a request for retaining autonomy. When Athens itself had recently succumbed to anti-democratic impulses, he might well have asked, should Chalcedon be punished severely for similar experiments?

II. Related Endeavors

Form and subject matter fit, diplomacy by sophists was common, and a suitable occasion is attested. This interpretation can also be buttressed by evidence of similar efforts by Thrasymachus in connection with other cities. In a speech on behalf of Larissa, he adapted a famous line from Euripides (frag. 719) to inveigh against submission to Archelaus, king of Macedonia from 413 until his murder in 399 (B2: Clem. Al. *Strom.* 6.2.16).

> And after Euripides said in the *Telephus,* "Are we who are Greeks going to be slaves to barbarians?" [Ἕλληνες ὄντες βαρβάροις δουλεύσομεν], Thrasymachus in his speech for the people of Larissa [ἐν τῷ ὑπὲρ Λαρισαίων] says, "Are we going to be slaves to Archelaus, Greeks to a barbarian?" [Ἀρχελάῳ δουλεύσομεν Ἕλληνες ὄντες βαρβάρῳ;]

The allusion could hardly be more pointed. Its source is one of Euripides' early plays, produced in 438 but well enough known for Aristophanes to parody it at length, first in the *Acharnenses* in 425 and again fourteen years later in the *Thesmophoriazusae.* The play told how a gravely wounded Telephus came to Thessaly seeking a cure as the Achaeans assembled for Troy, and how he was rebuffed until his Greek parentage was recognized. The line Thrasymachus rewrote apparently comes from a harangue by one of the Achaean leaders to his fellows, and its defiant chauvinism is brutally apt.[36] Archelaus, despite claiming descent from Telephus' own father

34. On this interpretation, the recent leaders derided in §1b are those who led the revolt, perhaps including the Spartan forces; for ἐπιμέλεσθαι in reference to Spartans, see n. 29 above. In placing the blame wholly on the leadership, Thrasymachus sides with Athens against its acknowledged enemies, whom he berates in order to mitigate Athenian hostility toward the remaining Chalcedonians.

35. Unlike κοινοτάτη (cf. n. 22 above), this phrase would fit debate about the Athenian constitution; see Ostwald, *Popular Sovereignty,* p. 373, n. 137, who connects it with the Athenian review of inherited statutes.

36. E. W. Handley suggests the speaker is Achilles; see Handley and John Rea, *The "Telephus" of Euripides, BICS* supp. 5 (London, 1957), 33. Cf. C. R. Austin, *Nova Fragmenta Euripidea in papyris reperta* (Berlin, 1968), 66–82; Austin suspects that the line, which he numbers frag. 127, may belong at his frag. 147.56. Clement cites it as one of a host of cases of plagiarism; all of his examples are classical, which suggests that the dossier on which he drew was itself fairly early.

(namely, Heracles), was also stigmatized as barbarian. Given what is known about Macedonian incursions into Thessaly around the turn of the century, the point of Thrasymachus' indignant question was probably to urge resistance to Archelaus' aggression and support for Thessalian autonomy. Like Demosthenes some fifty years later, he was appalled at the thought of Greeks yielding to the barbarian power of a Macedonian autocrat. But his barb may have had an indirect target as well: over the last decade of the Peloponnesian War, Archelaus was an extremely obliging ally of Athens, which granted him extraordinary honors in 407/6.[37] Thus, in denouncing a king whose pretensions to Hellenism many Greeks must have thought plainly belied by his aiding and abetting Athens, Thrasymachus damns both: Archelaus for supporting an oppressor, Athens for honoring a quasi-barbarian, and each for aggression against independent Greek cities.[38]

Active resistance is also attested. Aristotle, in a discussion of the downfall of democratic regimes, assigns Thrasymachus the leading role in overthrowing democracy at Aeolian Cyme (*Pol.* 5.5 1305a1: κατέλυσε).[39] The primary cause of revolution was apparently economic: Aristotle cites Cyme as a parallel to events at Heraclea and Megara which exemplify how abuse of the wealthy provokes rebellion (5.5 1304b31–5a7). But the city also had a history of anti-Athenian efforts. Ionian exiles urged Sparta to use Cyme as a base for fomenting revolt after the fall of Mytilene in 427 (Thuc. 3.31); it joined in the widespread revolt of 412 (8.22), welcomed Spartans that winter (8.31.3–4), and provided a base for Lesbian rebels the following summer (8.100.3). After Notion in 406, Alcibiades dealt so harshly with the city that it sent envoys to Athens to protest (Diod. 13.73). But that autumn, after Arginusae, it again offered Peloponnesians refuge (13.99.6). As this carousel history shows, democracy at Cyme required Athenian support, which it lacked between 412 and 406 and then again when Lysander arrived the following year. Thus, the overthrow of democracy was intertwined with a campaign for local autonomy, both of which Thrasymachus presumably championed.[40]

Similar sentiments seem to lie behind a reference Thrasymachus made to the signal honors Athens awarded Chios. In remarks he included in his "Great Art" and which probably appeared in one of his speeches, he described how Athens, from at least 423 to 414, bestowed on Chians the unique gratitude of including them in its official prayers (B3: schol. Ar. *Av.* 878–80).[41]

37. Above all for major contributions to Athenian shipbuilding: *IG* 1^3 117; *GHI* 91; cf. *IG* 1^3 89, an earlier alliance with Perdiccas. On Archelaus, see Eugene Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton, 1990), 161–79; on the issue of ethnicity and Archelaus' possible exclusion from Panhellenic festivals, see Ernst Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," in *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*, ed. Beryl Barr-Sharrar and Eugene Borza (Washington, 1982), 33–51.

38. Thrasymachus' initial outburst is provoked by Socrates' ironic praise of despots, including Archelaus' father Perdiccas (*Resp.* 336A). Disagreements about the nature of justice aside, Plato apparently shared Thrasymachus' dislike of the Macedonian king: see the denunciation he has Polus spout at *Gorgias* 470D–71D; Socrates is also rumored to have rejected an invitation from Archelaus (Arist. *Rh.* 2.23 1398a24–26).

39. I defend the relevance of this testimonium in appendix 2.

40. Aristotle may preserve a trace of his rhetoric in this campaign: ridiculing appeals to the slogan of τὸ πάτριον to justify "archaic laws" (cf. n. 21 above), he cites an egregious instance at Cyme (*Pol.* 2.8 1268b39–69a9).

41. Similar allusions in Eupolis (*Poleis* frag. 246 K–A, ca. 422) and Aristophanes (*Av.* 878–80 in 414) indicate the notoriety of this favoritism. On Thrasymachus' "Great Art," see n. 15 above.

The island, long the stalwart among Athenian allies, repeatedly contributed forces to major campaigns, beginning at least with the Samian revolt and continuing down to the Sicilian expedition and, after Mytilene revolted, only Chios continued to provide ships and troops rather than funds.[42] Yet where Athens saw unique reliability, its enemies must have seen supreme treachery: in the eyes of those opposed to Athens, the Chians were willing collaborators in suppressing Greek freedom. Thus, the scholium reporting Thrasymachus' comment ascribes the same view to Theopompus (F104), whose hostility to Athenian imperialism is well attested; though Chian himself, his sympathies lay firmly with the campaign to liberate the Greek cities from Athenian control.[43] Opponents of Athens would always find the story of Chian collaboration offensive, but it acquired brutal irony after Syracuse when, after many years of Athenian prayers wishing the same benefits for both Chians and Athenians, both cities turned to oligarchy. To recall those prayers in the following years, as Thrasymachus did, must have been invidious. On the other hand, singling out the honor Athens showed Chios would be less invidious after 405, when Athens extended the even greater honor of citizenship to Samians (*IG* 1^3 127: *GHI* 94; cf. *IG* 1^3 96, Thuc. 8.21).

One other anecdote points in the same direction. In one of his proems, Thrasymachus told how Timocreon of Rhodes, after gorging himself at dinner with the Great King, bested several Persians in boxing (B4: Ath. 10 415F–16A). There is more than a hint of chauvinism in this tale of a Greek outdoing Persians first at their own forte (feasting: *Ach.* 77–78), then at the peculiarly Hellenic tradition of athletic combat. But as in his condemnation of Archelaus, here too Thrasymachus seems to have combined an assertion of ethnic superiority with an implicit rebuke to Athens. For Timocreon was notoriously hostile to Themistocles, whom he denounced in scathing lyrics (*PMG* frags. 727–30). The extant fragments focus on allegations of venality, but their context—an account of the widespread resentment Themistocles incited by his high-handed treatment of the Greek cities after Plataea (Plut. *Them.* 21)—suggests that Timocreon was motivated by more than a private vendetta.[44] He calls Themistocles a traitor (frag. 727.5) and

42. Against Samos in 440–39 (Thuc. 1.116–17), in the Argolid in 430 (2.56.2), for the suppression of Mende and Scione in 423 (4.129.2), against Melos in 416 (5.84), and again in Sicily (6.31.2, 7.57.4). All this Chios did despite Athenian worries about the oligarchy it was allowed to preserve (4.51); see J. P. Barron, "Chios in the Athenian Empire," in *Chios: A Conference at the Homereion in Chios*, ed. John Boardman and C. E. Vaphopoulou-Richardson (Oxford, 1986), 89–103, esp. 100–103.

43. For his hostility to Athenian imperialism, see F85–100, F105, F153–55, and W. R. Connor, *Theopompus and Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton, 1969); for his oligarchic sympathies and admiration for Sparta, see Flower, *Theopompus*, 71–83. The scholiast ascribes F104 to *Philippica* 12, which evidently included a digression on events of the 380s (cf. F103 on Cypriot affairs, and Flower, *Theopompus*, 163); Theopompus probably recalled earlier relations between Athens and Chios in connection with their alliance of 384/3 (*IG* 2^2 34: 31 Harding). Both here and in his description of Chalcedon (F62, quoted above, p. 316), he may echo Thrasymachus.

44. See Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, 55, 414–15; cf. Ruth Scodel, "Timocreon's Encomium of Aristeides," *CA* 2 (1983): 102–7. Frag. 727 opens with a priamel naming *alternando* two Spartans and two Athenians who led the resistance to Xerxes, which serves to highlight the attack on Themistocles. Mention of Pausanias, Xanthippus, and Leotychidas has been taken to indicate a date after Plataea and Mycale but before any of them was disgraced, hence 478 but, given the focus on Themistocles, a later date remains plausible; cf. Noel Robertson, "Timocreon and Themistocles," *AJP* 101 (1980): 61–78, esp. 67–68 on Themistocles' promotion of democracy in Greek cities.

accuses him of extortion, expulsions, and executions (727.8–9). In short, he derides him for treating the allies in ways Athens eventually institutionalized. Yet he praises Aristides (727.1–4), whose mild assessment of tribute in 478/7 won almost universal applause (Plut. *Arist.* 24). Timocreon thus reviles the man who soon became the embodiment of Athenian domination but extols the patron of allied autonomy. Though himself banished for medizing, he also exults in proclaiming to Hellas that Themistocles met a similar fate (frags. 728–30). Together, Timocreon's lampoons insinuate a broader point, that Athens, instead of subjecting other Greek cities to its will, should leave the eastern Greeks to the freedom for which the war had been fought. The survival of the poem is itself significant: to the end of the century and beyond, such appeals to Panhellenic unity remained a rallying cry for opposition to Athens.[45] For Thrasymachus to recount the bravado of a poet and athlete famously hostile to highhanded rule by alien powers, whether Persian or Athenian, would provide a rousing opening for a speech to opponents of either.

The evidence is slender but consistent. Thrasymachus repeatedly champions civic autonomy against outside intervention, and local aristocracies against tyranny or democracy.[46] His political sympathies, in B1 and his other efforts alike, bear directly on issues of justice, and they make him an apt spokesman for the ideas Plato has him espouse in the *Republic.* To conclude, then, I shall briefly indicate how his views are reflected there. Thrasymachus has suffered lasting ignominy for claiming that justice is the advantage of the stronger (*Resp.* 338C). But as Plato has Socrates point out immediately, what this means is far from clear (338C–D). Many today assume that his proposal is normative, that he *approves* the pursuit of self-interest and believes the stronger *should seek* their own advantage. But his initial explication suggests his claim is only descriptive, an empirical generalization of what he sees happening everywhere: the stronger simply *do seek* their own advantage (338D–E):[47]

> "Then don't you know," he said, "that some cities have tyranny, others have democracy, and others aristocracy?"
> "How could I not?"
> "Doesn't this have control in each city: what rules?"
> "Absolutely."
> "And each ruling body sets laws for its own advantage: a democracy sets democratic laws, a tyranny tyrannical laws, and the rest likewise."

45. Cf. the exhortations to Panhellenic concord in several "Olympic" speeches: Gorgias B7–9 (cf. A1; in 392?), Lysias 33 (in 388: Diod. 14.109), and Isocrates *Paneg.* (in 380); cf. Plato's related remarks about the same time in *Resp.* 470C. For how and why the poem acquired popularity, see E. M. Stehle, "Cold Meats: Timokreon on Themistokles," *AJP* 115 (1994): 507–24, esp. 522; Stehle also makes the appealing suggestion (p. 509) that Thrasymachus drew the anecdote in B4 from one of Timocreon's poems (cf. Robertson, "Timocreon," 63).

46. Athens' most adamant opponents were local aristocracies, but resistance to its hegemony hardly entails hatred of democracy. Socrates' argument for paternalism provokes a scathing response from Thrasymachus (*Resp.* 343), in which he ridicules not popular government but the imputation of benevolence to rulers, whoever they may be.

47. Timothy D. J. Chappell develops this interpretation in detail in "The Virtues of Thrasymachus," *Phronesis* 38 (1993): 1–17; cf. Guthrie, *History,* 3:92–97.

Everything here—the indignant opening, the insistent indicatives, the generic classification—suggests that his claim is based entirely on observation.[48] The sequel shows the same. Building his case simply on what he takes to be facts, Thrasymachus denounces the hypocrisy of popular attitudes: people pay lip-service to justice but everywhere prefer the fruits of injustice (343D–E); in the extreme case of tyranny, injustice actually enjoys the fairest reputation as well as the greatest success (344A–C). At no point, however, does he express clear approval for self-serving by the strong. On the contrary, if he simply reports the facts as he sees them, then his remarks are more likely to reflect a rejection of *Machtpolitik.* After all, it would be blatant defeatism for citizens of cities subject to Athenian control to advocate serving the interests of the stronger. The powerful may embrace this as a norm, because it offers some justification for their gains,[49] and people secure from its depredations may applaud the good fortune of tyranny (344C). But those threatened with subjugation by superior forces are far more likely to invoke the threat of higher powers, as do the Melians in Thucydides (especially 5.104, 112). Ruthless repression of the sort experienced by Melos also provides the most plausible context for Thrasymachus' remarkable pronouncement that "the gods do not watch human affairs; for they would not have disregarded the greatest good for people—justice—which *we* see people violating" (B8: Hermias *In Phdr.* 267C; cf. 352B1–2, which elicits his sarcasm).[50] Nowhere, in fact, does he advocate injustice as some sort of higher "natural" law. And even Glaucon's elaboration of his claims, which describes justice as a contract among the weak (358E–59B), associates nature more closely with justice than injustice (ἡ φύσις δικαιοσύνης . . . καὶ ἐξ ὧν πέφυκε, 359B4–5; C5 refers only to "pursuit of having more," not to "injustice"). At bottom, then, Thrasymachus argues not as an immoralist like Callicles but as an idealist, and his claims express the outrage of a man disillusioned and embittered by the brutal realities of fifth-century power politics.

Plato actually indicates near the end of *Republic* 1 that what angered Thrasymachus most was Athenian imperialism. After leading him to an embarrassed admission that justice is after all a kind of wisdom rather than folly, Socrates presses on to argue that justice is actually conducive to strength (350D). When Thrasymachus shows some reluctance to continue the interrogation (350E), Socrates first persuades him to answer sincerely, then pointedly shifts the discussion to relations *between* cities (351B):[51]

48. Note the emphasis on universality: "each," "all," "everywhere." In the same vein, Plato in the *Phaedrus* criticizes both Thrasymachus and Lysias for neglecting "method" and theory (269D), and says both rest content with "trial and experience" (270B; cf. A2).

49. So the Athenians first in Sparta (1.76.2), then at Melos (Thuc. 5.89–90, 105), each time in regard to *intercity* relations; likewise Callicles in the *Gorgias,* who is clearly a beneficiary of Athenian imperialism; see Dodds, "*Gorgias,*" 13.

50. See Guthrie, *History,* 3:97, 298; cf. Döring, "Platons Darstellung," 15. G. B. Kerferd, "The Doctrine of Thrasymachus," *DUJ* 40 (1947): 19–27 (in *Sophistik,* ed. C. J. Classen [Darmstadt, 1976], 545–63; see 559), argues that Thrasymachus in the *Republic* expresses "the point of view of the ruled."

51. The sincerity of Thrasymachus in this passage requires a word of defense, since his grudging comment about talking to old ladies (350E2–4) raises doubts about his willingness to speak frankly. However, he promptly agrees to answer sincerely (E6), and in the immediate sequel to the passage I quote, he carefully distinguishes what the argument entails and what he continues to believe (351C1–3).

"Would you agree that it is wrong for a city both to undertake to enslave other cities wrongly and to subjugate them, and also to hold sway over many cities after enslaving them?"

"Of course I do," he said. "And that is exactly what the best and most completely unjust city will do best of all."

"I understand," I said, "that this was your claim."

The contemporary city to which Socrates' question most readily applies is Athens. His terms, in fact, encapsulate a widespread view of several decades of Athenian history in three infinitives: the city's early *attempts* to transform the Delian League into an empire (ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι), its *success* in establishing power (καταδεδουλῶσθαι), and its ongoing struggle to *retain* control (ὑφ' ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν) even in the face of enormous military opposition.[52] Answering with a formula that expresses impatience with Socrates for asking something so obvious (πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; cf. the same response to obvious questions at 354A), Thrasymachus emphatically agrees that a city able to achieve all this is "completely unjust." It is also "best" (ἀρίστη), he proclaims, not because it abides by the traditional canons of virtue—which he belittles, then defiantly reserves the title of "virtue" for despotism (348D–E)—but rather because it "has more than all others" (349C).[53] Aiming to show the importance of justice for all cooperative endeavors, Socrates goes on to argue that even cities bent on subjugating others require some form of justice within if they are to avoid destroying themselves first (351C–52C). But both his question and response acknowledge that Thrasymachus has grounds for complaint and finally reveal its primary source: what the visitor from Chalcedon had in mind, apparently from the outset, was the advantage of the stronger city (ἡ κρείττων γιγνομένη πόλις, 351B7). Hence his contempt for the smug pieties of the opening conversation (336B–C), hence his initial focus on political authority and positive law (338D–E),[54] hence his passionate defense of his claims in the face of repeated rebuttal. Listening in Athens to talk about the just faring better than the unjust was simply too much for Thrasymachus to endure.

Similar realism informs the argument in his speech to the Athenians. Speaking as an envoy for a city once again subject to Athens, Thrasymachus appeals directly to his audience's self-interest and only indirectly to any nobler instincts. His main contention is that Athens gains by leaving Chalcedon autonomous, and if the picture of crisis sketched in the proem encourages leniency, it does so by emphasizing the city's tradition of discipline and reliability. Indeed, his first argument in the *Republic,* that governments of all ideological stripes pursue only their own interests, simply generalizes the opening claim in his speech. The primary target of his indictment in each

52. In his note on 351B, James Adam, ed., *The "Republic" of Plato* (Cambridge, 1902), also recognizes these three stages and cites Athens as an example.

53. Compare 351B3 with 348D3–6, where Thrasymachus equates "good" with the power to subdue cities and regions: πόλεις τε καὶ ἔθνη δυνάμενοι ὑφ' ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι. His choice of superlative at 351B4 (ἀρίστη rather than κρατίστη or βελτίστη) reflects the preceding discussion of ἀρετή (cf. 359A6) and also recalls his initial reference to "aristocracy" (338D8).

54. His famous thesis echoes in his first examples: δημοκρατοῦνται, ἀριστοκρατοῦνται, and κρατεῖ (338D); his own explanation (338E), which Glaucon reformulates in terms of contract and law (359A), captures what Aristotle later characterizes as "legal" or "general" justice (*Eth. Nic.* 5.1).

case is government, not private morality, and he focuses not on personal vice but on the arrogant exercise of political power. Far from asserting that might makes right, he challenges its very legitimacy. In the speech, he divorces his city's recent leadership from both its citizens and its constitution; and in the *Republic,* he contends that injustice is simply "stronger, more independent, more domineering" (344C) and, in the end, the shrewder policy (348C). Power, though it enables its possessors to dictate the conduct of others, confers no higher authority.

Cynical this diagnosis may be. But it is neither unreasonable nor unfair, and it is hardly immoral. On the contrary, even Plato's caricature presents Thrasymachus as a penetrating critic of contemporary political affairs who is dismayed by the triumphs of injustice; and his Athenian speech shows him arguing passionately for a just resolution. Other testimony, moreover, shows him consistently opposed to exploitation of the weak by superior forces. What he advocates, and was apparently willing to support by action as well as in his oratory, is the preservation of local autonomy. Thrasymachus was thus a precursor to Demosthenes in more ways than ancient critics acknowledge. Not only did his empassioned rhetoric sow the seeds of the grand style; he also championed the Greek tradition of independent πόλεις in a sustained struggle against outside aggressors. But even while Thrasymachus decried the rise of Macedonian aggression, the focus of his protests was ironically Demosthenes' own Athens.

APPENDIX 1: The Dramatic Date of Plato's *Republic*

When did Thrasymachus visit Athens? It has long been held that his rhetorical innovations had won him a reputation in Athens by 427, the year Aristophanes spoofs the rhetorical interest of someone named Thrasymachus in *Daitales,* his first play (frag. 205 K–A: frag. 198 Kock). But Ian Storey has cast grave doubt on this by arguing convincingly that the reference is not to the sophist but to a character in the play; the sophist, he suggests, did not visit Athens before 418.[55] His case gains indirect support from the fact that the name is attested four other times for Athenians of the later fifth century (cf. n. 64 below): a casualty of war in 423 (*IG* 1^3 1184.26: *IG* 1^2 949), a character in Theopompus' *Stratiotides* (frag. 57 K–A, ca. 410–406), a dead uncle of the plaintiffs in Isaeus 4 (from the 370s; the uncle must have been born well back into the fifth century, since the speech concerns the recent death of his alleged son), and a friend of the man bringing a complaint (probably wrongly) preserved in the corpus of Lysias (8.14–16).

Evidence for Thrasymachus' age also accords much better with a visit to Athens well after 427. He was roughly the same age as Lysias, if not younger; hence he was probably born around 440, and not much before 450 at the earliest (see n. 27 above). Even in the latter case, it would be very odd if he were already well enough known in Athens to be lampooned on the stage in 427. It is one thing for Aristophanes to target Alcibiades (frag. 205.6), a strongwilled Athenian of eminent family who was famous by his teens, or Lysistratus (frag. 205.2), a "well-known man about town" and celebrated wit (see D. M. McDowell on *Vesp.* 787). It is quite another to ascribe recognizable rhetorical innovations to an alien youth, no matter how precocious. Most telling, however, is that the sophist was much closer in age to Lysias than to Gorgias (born ca. 485), who first came to Athens in 427; it was the novel style of Gorgias, not of Thrasymachus, that astounded Athenians then (Diod. 12.53.3, Philostr. *VS* 1.9.3). If born about 440, Thrasymachus could easily describe himself in 407 as a member of the "younger" generation (νεωτέροις, §1a; the comparative is

55. I. C. Storey, "Thrasymachus at Athens: Aristophanes fr. 205 (*Daitales*)," *Phoenix* 42 (1988): 212–18; as he points out, F. V. Fritzsche and August Meineke took the same view in the 1830s.

significant); and even if he was born a decade earlier, his claim would be both accurate and credible, especially in an address to the Athenian Assembly or Council, where seniority mattered enough to affect the order of speakers (Aeschin. 1.23, 3.4: those over fifty speak first; cf. Lys. 16.20). Finally, a visit in 407 rather than 427 fits better with indications that he remained active into the next century. Ephippus, in his *Nauagos,* also alludes to a Thrasymachus in connection with Plato's rivals (frag. 14 K–A: Ath. 11 509 C–D). If this refers to the sophist, then again like Lysias, he was probably still active around 380.[56]

Thrasymachus may well have visited Athens more than once, and Plato does not say why he appears in the *Republic*. But an attractive possibility is that he owes his role there to negotiations between Athens and Chalcedon in 407. The occasion was presumably memorable; and the clues to the dramatic date of the dialogue, though not entirely consistent, fit that time better than any other. The most precise evidence involves the festival of the Bendideia, which provides the occasion for the dialogue (327A–28A) and fixes the season as late spring or early summer (cf. 350D2), since the festival took place on Thargelion 19 (schol. *Resp.* 327a, Procl. *In Ti.* 26). Unfortunately, this does not help with the year. Plato's reference to "the first performance" (ἅτε νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοντες, 327A), combined with inscriptions recording changes in the cult (*IG* 1^3 136), suggests that the dialogue occurred the year a new festival was first celebrated, ca. 412.[57] But even this is indecisive, since Plato describes a "novel" event (καινόν, 328A), which may have been added later (see *SEG* 10 64). At the very least, then, the festival does not preclude 407. Its timing, moreover, would put Thrasymachus in Athens at the same time as Alcibiades, who returned in time to oversee the Plynteria on Thargelion 25 (Plut. *Alc.* 34.1–2).

Several other chronological details fall into place if the dialogue is set in 407. Socrates twits the link Thrasymachus asserts between justice and the stronger by citing the Thessalian pancratiast Polydamas (338C); this athlete of legendary strength won his first Olympic victory in 408, which suits 407 well.[58] An allusion to recent military exploits of Plato's own brothers in a celebrated battle at Megara (εὐδοκιμήσαντας, 368A) most likely refers to an Athenian victory near Nisaea in 409 (λαμπρῶς ἀγωνισαμένων, Diod. 13.65).[59] The only other major battle attested there was in 424 (Thuc. 4.66–74), when both brothers were too young to fight; indeed, both would be less than ten years old if the dialogue took place in 427, but in their twenties in 407.[60] Lysias, present (328B) but silent throughout, apparently spent his youth in Thurii and returned only after the Sicilian disaster (Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 1); his presence thus requires a date after 412/11. Also present are his brother Polemarchus and Nicias' son Niceratus (327B–C), who provide a *terminus ante quem,* since both were murdered in 404.[61] Niceratus served as trierarch at Samos in 409

56. The date of the play, though uncertain, probably falls between 380 and 360; see T. B. L. Webster, *Studies in Later Greek Comedy*^{2} (Manchester, 1970), 50–52. Diels omits this fragment, presumably because he thought it referred to a Corinthian who taught Stilpo (Diog. Laert. 2.113); but K. Döring, *Die Megariker* (Amsterdam, 1972), 163, considers this one too obscure to be named in comedy. In fact, the date of the play is a red herring; even if the sophist died much earlier, his reputation endured long enough to earn him a prominent role in the *Republic* and repeated mention in the *Phaedrus,* both probably completed in the 370s.

57. For discussion, see Jan Pecírka, *The Formula for the Grant of Enktesis in Attic Inscriptions* (Prague, 1966), 122–30; cf. Martin Ostwald, *CAH* 5^2, 313.

58. For his astounding feats, see Pausanias 6.5, who calls him the biggest human ever, except for the heroes; see Karl Scherling, "Polydamas 4," *RE* 21.2 (1952): 1601. A major figure in Thessalian politics of the 370s (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1 and 6.4.34), he sought alliance with Sparta and took a dim view of Athens and Macedonia (6.1.10–12). This would make him attractive to Thrasymachus, who was also actively engaged in Thessalian resistance to Macedonia (on B2, see above) and who no doubt admired the athlete's pluck (Paus. 6.5.7 closely parallels the tale of Timocreon in B4).

59. See R. P. Legon, *Megara: The Political History of a Greek City-State to 336 B. C.* (Ithaca, 1981), 253–54; cf. Antony Andrewes, *CAH* 5^2, 486.

60. Davies, *APF,* 332–33, puts Adeimantus' birth in 435–30 and Glaucon's ca. 428. Plato cites a line of an elegy by "Glaucon's lover," which suggests that Glaucon served as an ephebe at the battle, hence also points to 409.

61. For Polemarchus, see Lys. 12. For Niceratus, see Lys. 18.6, Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.39, Diod. 14.5.5, and Davies, *APF,* 405; this Niceratus may also be the butt of a memorable gibe by Thrasymachus, who compared him to Philoctetes after he lost a singing contest (ῥαψῳδοῦντα, A5: Arist. *Rh.* 3.11 1413a7–10): Nicias' son prided himself on his mastery of Homer (Xen. *Symp.* 3.6).

(*IG* 1^3 375.36: *GHI* 84); a dramatic date of 407 would suit a return that summer with Alcibiades, if not the year before. Plato also names as present and silent Lysias' other brother, Euthydemus (328B), about whom nothing else is known except that he too spent his youth in Thurii (Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 1). But the very absence of any mention of him in Lysias' speech against Eratosthenes suggests that he too had either died or left Athens by 404.

The presence of Clitophon (328B, 340A–B) accords excellently with a date during the last decade of the war, when he was a prominent participant in Athenian politics (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 29.3, 34.3, Ar. *Ran.* 967). One other silent guest is Charmantides of Paiania (328B). A Paianian of that name was treasurer of Athena in 427/6 (*IG* 1^3 299.39, 324.56, 350.62). But he was probably an old man by 407, if still alive; *IG* 1^3 1328 (*IG* 2^2 13059) is a tombstone from the later 420s for someone of that name. However, his grandson of the same name was a choregic victor at the Thargelia sometime between 403 and 370 (*IG* 2^2 1138.25), a trierarch ca. 370 (*IG* 2^2 1609.46), and one of a handful of students widely enough respected for Isocrates to name him as a character-witness in defense of his own reputation (*Antid.* 93–96 in 353). This prominent figure is more likely the one Plato had in mind; since χορεγοί had to be at least forty (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 56.3), his career would make him roughly Plato's age, hence a natural person to join the other young men at Cephalus' house in 407.[62]

The only clear anachronism concerns Cephalus himself, who was all but certainly dead by 410, and probably by 420.[63] But Plato depicts him as "very old" (328B; the phrase from Hom. *Il.* 22.60 and 24.487, quoted at 328E, suggests he had reached Priam's age) and preoccupied with imminent death (330D–E). But the anachronism is sentimentally effective and well within ancient norms of dramatic license. With this one well-motivated exception, then, the evidence for all the *dramatis personae* of the dialogue is compatible with a dramatic date in 407, and most of it actually supports the considerations previously adduced in favor of that or a nearby year much better than it fits any other period.

APPENDIX 2: A Neglected Testimonium

In his discussion of the causes of revolution in democracies, Aristotle describes three similar cases, one of which occurred at Cyme and involved someone named Thrasymachus (*Ath. Pol.* 5.5. 1304b31–5a7):

> The δῆμος in Heraclea was also overthrown, right after the colonization, because the leaders of the δῆμος treated the prominent families unjustly and drove them out; but they joined together, returned, and overthrew the δῆμος. The democracy in Megara was overthrown in a similar way: the leaders of the δῆμος, in order to have property to distribute [δημεύειν], banished many of the prominent families, but the exiles came back, defeated the δῆμος in battle, and established the oligarchy. The same thing also happened at Cyme to the democracy that Thrasymachus overthrew. In most other cases as well, one can see change occurring this way: sometimes the leaders of the δῆμος, in their attempts to gratify the δῆμος, unite the prominent families by treating them unjustly, either by dividing up their estates or by making them finance public services, and sometimes they bring charges against the wealthy in order to distribute their possessions.

Diels omits this reference to Cyme from his testimonia for Thrasymachus; and neither Kurt von Fritz ("Thrasymachos 3," *RE* 6A [1937]: 592–93) nor K. E. Oppenheimer ("Thrasymachos 1," 584–92) entertains the possibility that the Chalcedonian was involved. But their identity is quite probable. Aristotle mentions the name six times, always by itself without an article or ethnic, and every other instance clearly refers to the sophist. The name was not common in the Classical

62. See Davies, *APF*, 573–74; cf. W. H. Thompson, "Prosopographical Notes on Athena's Treasurers," *Hesperia* 34 (1965): 148–53. Pace Thompson, the data are consistent with Charmantides having a brother who served on the Council after 355 (*IG* 2^2 1751.10) and a son who served even near the end of the century (*IG* 2^2 1753.22).

63. Davies, *APF*, 588: he "must have died by 421."

period: of twenty-eight instances preserved for the Aegean and Cyrenaica, most are late, one is sixth-century (a Melian), none fifth-century, and only one other (a Euboean) can be dated early enough to be known by Aristotle.[64] Only one other Thrasymachus was at all well known, a fourth-century Corinthian who taught the Megarian philosopher Stilpo (Diog. Laert. 2.113; see n. 56 above). Hence, if Aristotle had wanted his audience to think of anyone other than the sophist here, he would naturally have added some word or phrase to distinguish him.

Aristotle also neglects to specify the location of Cyme, and Newman cautiously refrains from deciding between the Aeolian city and Italian Cumae.[65] But the former is far more likely. It was apparently ripe for rebellion when Mytilene revolted in 427 (Thuc. 3.31.2). It had compelling reasons to revolt, since it paid the highest tribute in the Ionian district.[66] And revolt is certain for 412 (Thuc. 8.22; cf. 8.100.3) and quite likely recurred in 406 (Diod. 13.99.6).

The context of Aristotle's discussion also favors Aeolia near the end of the Peloponnesian War. He mentions Cyme last in a series of five revolutions (1304b20–5a7), all of which he attributes to demagogues and contrasts with cases that he considers much earlier (ἀρχαίων, a7) and blames on tyrants instead (a7–15; cf. a21–26 on Pisistratus and Theagenes). Moreover, though dating is uncertain, each of the five more recent cases seems to involve events during or shortly after the war: the revolution at Cos (1304b25–27) most likely occurred ca. 412–406 (cf. Diod. 13.69.5, Thuc. 8.108.2) and that at Rhodes (1304b27–31) probably in 391 (Diod. 14.97), though the previous decade is also possible (13.38.5);[67] Heraclea's was most likely ca. 422;[68] Megara's almost certainly in 424.[69] At Italian Cumae, on the other hand, the only attested revolution against "popular" government fits the pattern Aristotle calls "ancient," since it was provoked by the tyrant Aristodemus (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 7.2–11). Even geography favors the Aeolian city, since four of the five sites are in the Aegean or Pontus, while the fifth, Megara, was the mother-city of both Heraclea and Thrasymachus' own Chalcedon; the Italian city, founded by Euboeans, would be out of place. Finally, there is secure evidence that Aristotle was familiar with the history of the Aeolian city but none that he was well informed about the Italian city: Heraclides Lembus epitomizes an Aristotelian *Politeia* for the former (cf. frags. 530–31 Gigon), whereas none is attested for the latter.[70] Though none of these arguments is conclusive, cumulatively they strongly support adding Aristotle's testimony to our evidence for Thrasymachus of Chalcedon.

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64. See P. M. Fraser and Elaine Matthews, *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names,* vol. 1 (Oxford, 1988). For fifth-century Athenians, see appendix 1 above; two more from the fourth century, and six from still later are listed in M. J. Osborne and S. G. Byrne, *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names,* vol. 2 (Oxford, 1994).

65. W. L. Newman, ed., *The "Politics" of Aristotle,* vol. 4 (Oxford, 1902), on 1304b39.

66. Meiggs, *Athenian Empire,* 270.

67. For Cos, see S. M. Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos,* Hypomnemata 51 (Göttingen, 1978), 34–38; on pp. 375–77, she raises ca. 444 as a possibility. For Rhodes, see Newman, "*Politics,*" on 1302b23.

68. This is probably the Pontic colony founded by Megara ca. 560; see Newman, "*Politics,*" on 1305b33. The revolt Aristotle describes must be ca. 422, if the colonization he mentions (μετὰ τὸν ἀποικισμὸν εὐθύς, 1304b31–32) refers not to the foundation of Heraclea itself (which would conflict with 1305a7) but to its "sending off" the colonists who founded Chersonesus in Tauris; see S. Y. Saprykine, "Héraclée du Pont et Chersonésos Taurique: Institutions publiques et rapports fonciers," *DHA* 17 (1991): 103–17, esp. 106–7; cf. Stanley Burstein, *Outpost of Hellenism: The Emergence of Heraclea on the Black Sea* (Berkeley, 1976), 34.

69. See Newman, "*Politics,*" on 1300a17; cf. Thuc. 4.66–74.

70. Cf. Olof Gigon, *Aristotelis Opera v. III: Librorum Deperditorum Fragmenta* (Berlin, 1987), 660: "Ob das kampanische Kyme eine Politie besass, kann man bezweifeln."